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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, because of the widely accepted belief in the “right 
to know” information of public concern, freedom of speech generally over-
rides public figures’ right to privacy.  As a result, public figures have almost 
no right to privacy, even when the published information is false.  The digi-
tal era brings new threats to public figures’ privacy and invokes the need to 
rethink this norm.  We agree with the notion that public figures, by virtue 
of their position in society, waive a substantial part of their right to privacy 
when there is an important and legitimate purpose behind informing the 
public of certain information.  However, we depart from the United States’ 
legal norm by maintaining that, unders certain conditions, public figures 
should be able to enjoy a right to privacy similar to that afforded to private 
citizens.  In support of this proposition, we have developed a Three Princi-
ple Filtering Model, to be used in determining whether or not the rationale 
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for publishing information about public figures is legitimate and hence 
should be allowed or prohibited.  The Three Principle Model requires an 
analysis of (1) the relevancy of the private information to the public and (2) 
whether access to the information is necessary for imparting knowledge, 
and then the application of (3) a proportionality rule.  We argue that the 
current legal norm in the U.S. is excessively permissive, allowing virtually 
any publication about public figures and too often resulting in the exposure 
of private information to an extent that is neither reasonable nor legitimate.  
Our model, while accepting the public right to know (unlike other models), 
better balances this right against competing values.  It also sheds light on 
the debate surrounding the privacy of public figures from different angles 
than those examined by the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court’s 
rulings on public figures were shaped by defamation cases and sound main-
ly in First Amendment issues, emphasizing freedom of expression and free-
dom of the press.  This perspective sets the public and the press as protago-
nists, whereas our model, focusing on the issue of privacy, locates 
individuals at the center of the discourse.  Moreover, the prevailing privacy 
norm is based on liberal conceptions, whereas our approach is more 
grounded in personality theories that enable a “balloon” of privacy, even 
within public domains, including cyberspace.  The Supreme Court did not 
account for the digital era when shaping its tests.  Our model is not based 
on any specific jurisdiction and can be implemented worldwide. 
We argue that when the public’s only interest is to invade privacy for 
the sake of curiosity (snooping, gossip or perverted behavior), where the in-
formation does not carry any valuable influence over the person looking for 
the information—publication of private information about public figures 
will not be justified.  Further, the joy people obtain from invading someone 
else’s private and intimate life does not justify the harm to that person’s pri-
vacy, and allowing this kind of invasion contradicts the fundamental values 
of freedom, autonomy, and dignity. 
Our proposed model may help policy makers in the process of filtering 
between justified and unjustified publications of private information about 
public figures, while preserving space in their balloon of privacy. 
Part I addresses the problem that the digital era brings into the discus-
sion of public figure privacy.  Part II defines public figures and analyzes the 
varying definitions of private information as it pertains to this article’s dis-
cussion.  Part III offers a background on the right to privacy and its origins 
in the U.S. legal system.  In particular, it describes U.S. privacy law in the 
context of the First and Fourth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.  This 
discussion includes a contrast with the European approach, which differs by 
focusing on personal dignity and, hence, personal control over one’s public 
image.  Part IV presents the new Three Principle Filtering Model for de-
termining what information about public figures should be protected.  Fi-
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nally, Part V discusses the legal tools needed to implement the proposed 
Three Principle Filtering Model. 
I.  PRIVACY OF PUBLIC FIGURES IN THE DIGITAL ERA 
When movie star Jennifer Lawrence, who rose to fame for her portrayal 
of the heroine in the popular Hunger Games films, uploaded photos to her 
iCloud account, she never paused to consider that they could be considered 
fair game by a relentless media eager to capitalize on her fame.  But in Sep-
tember, 2014, hackers targeted her account and, to their delight, found, 
and were able to download and republish, the actress’s private photo-
graphs, including, to Ms. Lawrence’s utter dismay, a number of private 
nude photos.2  The incident sparked controversy, drawing attention not on-
ly to the vulnerabilities of Apple’s virtual data storage service and the Inter-
net in general,3 but also to the old debate as to whether or not people whose 
fortunes are based on their fame and public image have any right to keep 
any part of their lives private.4 
The conflict between the public’s right to have access to information, on 
the one hand, and, on the other hand, individual privacy rights has been 
magnified in the digital age by the intensive use of the Internet.  Its usage 
has emerged as a primary source of information for a tremendous number 
of people who interact daily on a massive scale via a variety of social media 
platforms.5  These tools include wall posts, tweets, hash-tags, photo tagging, 
and the ability to share pictures, videos, and music.6  During the past dec-
ade the ascendance of Big Data, tsunami of data security breaches, broad 
internet access, growth of Internet behavioral marketing, and proliferation 
 
 2 Andrea Peterson, Emily Yahr & Joby Warrick, Leaks of Nude Celebrity Photos Raise Concerns About 
Security of the Cloud, WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2014), 
http://www.mudesign.net/webdesign/stolen_photos.pdf. 
 3 See, e.g., Issie Lapowsky, We’d All Benefit if Celebs Sue Apple Over the Photo Hack, WIRED (Sept. 4, 
2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/09/law-apple-photo-hack/ (noting that some le-
gal and cybersecurity experts have called for a lawsuit over the 2014 hack in order “to push Ap-
ple and other online companies to more aggressively protect the people using their services”); Su-
sannah Guthrie, Hack Job: JLaw and the Risks of iCloud, THE NEW DAILY (Sep. 1, 2014), 
http://thenewdaily.com.au/life/2014/09/01/hidden-risks-icloud-jennifer-lawrence/ (warning 
that “[e]veryone who uses the iCloud is vulnerable to . . . hacking”); Laurel O’Connor, Celebrity 
Nude Photo Leak: Just One More Reminder That Privacy Does Not Exist Online and Legally, There’s Not Much 
We Can Do About It, GGU L. REV. BLOG, Paper 30 (2014), 
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggu_law_review_blog/30 (noting that the 2014 iCloud leak 
“was the largest leak of its kind to happen all at once”). 
 4 Cover Exclusive: Jennifer Lawrence Calls Photo Hacking a “Sex Crime,” VANITY FAIR (Oct. 7, 2014, 8:54 
AM), http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2014/10/jennifer-lawrence-cover?mbid=social_-
twitter. 
 5 Millions, if not billions, interact online using social media every single day.  JOSÉ VAN DIJCK, 
THE CULTURE OF CONNECTIVITY: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF SOCIAL MEDIA 4 (2013). 
 6 Id. at 3–4. 
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of tracking technologies have come to influence everyone's life—and, ac-
cording to this paper, ordinately affect public figures, about whom the pub-
lic is not just eager to swallow every detail but also has asserted a sense of 
entitlement, a right to know, especially in the U.S..7 
“We are in the midst of an information revolution,” the implications of 
which “we are only beginning to understand.”8  Once data is posted on the 
web it becomes eternal (despite the Google Spain court decision on the so-
called right to be forgotten, which, technologically, cannot be fully imple-
mented).9  The fact that online publications can reach a virtually infinite 
amount of users all around the globe coupled with the possibility that data 
might be everlasting invites policy makers to consider finding a better bal-
ance between these two conflicting rights in general.  More specifically, 
publications that remain for many years appear at the forefront of the con-
flict.  In other words, we should reconsider traditional legal norms about 
the (almost) absolute right of the public to know as it conflicts with the per-
sonal privacy concerns of public figures by giving more deference to the lat-
ter.  When doing so, we should think about new tools, recognizing and le-
gitimating both conflicting interests and helping us distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate uses of private information (including photos) af-
fording some semblance of privacy, even to public figures. 
This article will suggest a model, based on modern tools, which chal-
lenges the existing court decisions and better balances the classically con-
flicting rights of privacy and free expression. 
The Model goes along the justifications given in the Terry Gene Bollea 
(known publicly by the name Hulk Hogan) trial against Gawker Media, 
which provides an example of right to privacy case in an online context.  In 
that case, the Sixth Judical Circuit of Florida protected the right to privacy 
of Hogan—a well known public figure—and granted him more than 115 
million dollars in damages following the publication of a sex tape on Gawk-
er’s website, even though Hogan had made his sex life public in many other 
 
 7 See Scott J. Shackelford, Fragile Merchandise: A Comparative Analysis of the Privacy Rights for Public Fig-
ures, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 126 (2012) (noting that there has been “an increase in privacy viola-
tions, facilitated by new advanced surveillance technologies, which are feeding the appetites of 
people who want to know more about public figures of all types”); Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: 
Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1881 (2013) (explaining 
that, given the volume of data-collection practices, it is impossible for individuals to effectively 
manage their own privacy).  
 8 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. 
L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2001). 
 9 Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Case C-131/12, E.C.R., ¶ 100(4) 
(May 13, 2014) http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&-
docid=152065. 
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instances.  The court held the website liable for violating the public figure’s 
privacy and publicity rights when posting the tape in the Internet.10 
II.  A PUBLIC FIGURE – WHO ARE YOU? 
A.  Can Anyone Be a Public Figure? 
Recently, Rolling Stone Magazine published an interview by actor Sean 
Penn of a notorious drug lord known as “El Chapo,” calling him “the most 
wanted man in the world.”11  Consider the similarities—and differences—
between either the author or the subject of this interview and an innocent 
person who involuntary was the victim of a crime or a happenstance by-
stander at a demonstration, accident site, or other newsworthy location.  
Despite the differences in choices made by each, all of them—the Holly-
wood film actor, the international criminal, and the involuntary victim of 
circumstance—are all equivalently considered public figures, subject to ex-
posure of their public as well as personal lives in the eyes of the law.12   
We find that the answer to the question, “Can anyone be a public figure?” 
is absolutely positive.  This means that any one of us could suddenly be facing 
the consequences of exposed private details about our lives without any control. 
The U.S. courts have used a great many examples to define the category 
of  “public figure,” including, but not limited to: (1) celebrities (i.e., people 
from the entertainment sector);13 (2) those holding or formerly holding pub-
 
 10 Bollea v. Gawker Media LLC, No. 522012CA012447, 2016 WL 4073660, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
June 8, 2016) (declaring final judgment against Gawker).  A few months after the decision, Gawk-
er filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy, and the case subsequently settled.  Sydney Ember, Gawker and 
Hulk Hogan Reach $31 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/business/media/gawker-hulk-hogan-
settlement.html?_r=1.  Relatedly, consider the argument posed by President Donald Trump dur-
ing his campaign that the U.S. should reform libel laws to make it easier to sue news organiza-
tions, a task that’s at least a bit more difficult than the President made it sound.  Adam Liptak, 
Can Trump Change Libel Laws?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/us/politics/can-trump-change-libel-laws.html (arguing 
libel law is a state-law tort, and the president cannot change them).  
 11 Sean Penn, El Chapo Speaks: A Secret Visit with the Most Wanted Man in The World, ROLLING STONE 
(Jan 9, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/el-chapo-speaks-20160109. 
 12 See Jeffrey Omar Usman, Finding The Lost Involuntary Public Figure, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 951, 952 
(claiming that “involuntary public figures” as category of individuals in American defamation and 
First Amendment jurisprudence “has become lost”). 
 13 See, e.g., Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1141 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Entertainers 
can therefore be public figures for purposes of a publisher’s . . . First Amendment defense to a 
charge of false-light invasion of privacy.”); Ann-Margret v. High Soc’y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. 
Supp. 401, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“There is little doubt that the plaintiff, who has starred in nu-
merous movies and television programs over the last decade or so, is, as the term has come to be 
understood, a ‘public figure.’”). 
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lic office, including politicians and other elected officials;14 (3) criminals;15 (4) 
inventors, researchers, and academics;16 (5) war heroes;17 (6) figures from the 
news;18 and (7) unwilling or unexpected public figures (e.g., someone who 
was at the scene of a crime or in a demonstration),19 amongst others.20 
The definition of public figure is so broad that the group of public fig-
ures (who might suffer from being an open book to the public) includes not 
only future public figures, who one day after many years might be public fig-
ures but also third parties, such as relatives of people who might become pub-
lic figures in the future.  The case of Friedan v. Friedan is one of the best ex-
amples.  In this case, Betty Friedan’s husband was declared as public figure, 
retrospectively, regarding information from twenty-five (25!) years before 
she became famous as a feminist leader.21 
The U.S. legal definition of “public figure” includes those involved in 
past and contemporary events that might capture the public interest.22  
Even after many years have gone by, one-time public figures “hold” their 
 
 14 See, e.g., Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (stating that politicians who have 
become household names are “deemed public figures for all purposes” because they “occupy po-
sitions of such persuasive power and influence”); Biskupic v. Cicero, 756 N.W.2d 649, 657 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a former Wisconsin district attorney remained a public figure after 
his term as a public official ended because of ongoing publicity surrounding his actions, both 
while he was district attorney and afterward). 
 15 See, e.g., Marcone v. Penthouse Int’l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1085 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(“Although the criminal activity, by itself, may not create public figure status, such activity may, 
nevertheless, be one element in a mix of factors leading to that classification.”); Rosanova v. 
Playboy Enters., 580 F.2d 859, 860–61 (5th Cir. 1978) (determining Plaintiff was a public figure 
in a case where an article referred to him as a “mobster”). 
 16 See, e.g., Thompson v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 193 F.2d 953, 954 (3d Cir. 1952) (holding that an inven-
tor became a public figure after patenting an invention, analogizing to a playwright publishing a 
play); Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc. 20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 414 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (labeling 
“actors and actresses, professional athletes, public officers, noted inventors, explorers, [and] war 
heroes” as public figures). 
 17 See, e.g., Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 238 P.2d 670, 672 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (“We 
think that men who are called to the colors subject their activities in that particular field to the 
public gaze and may not contend that in the discharge of such activities their actions may not be 
publicized.”); Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950) (ex-
plaining that “plaintiff became a national figure in connection with” his heroic deeds as an “assis-
tant pharmacist’s mate in the United States Coast Guard”). 
 18 See, e.g., Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that public figure status 
could be achieved by inviting media attention in publicizing a purported affair with a prominent 
political leader).  Gennifer Flowers, the plaintiff, held a press conference where she played audio 
recordings of intimate phone calls from then-presidential-candidate Bill Clinton that she had se-
cretly taped.  Id. 
 19 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (“Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public 
figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public fig-
ures must be exceedingly rare.”). 
 20 For a discussion of additional court decisions, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 860 (5th ed. 1984), and LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 873 (2d ed. 1988). 
 21  Friedan v. Friedan, 414 F. Supp. 77, 78–79 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).  
 22 See Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). 
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status, enabling open access for the public to gain private information about 
one’s life in patronage of U.S. law.  The seminal 1940 case of James Sidis is 
a good example.23 
Sidis was a gifted (genius) child raised up by his father to be so.24  He 
spoke many languages before other children learned how to speak, lectured 
mathematicians on the topic of four dimensional bodies when he was eleven 
years old and graduated from Harvard when he was sixteen.25  He suffered 
tremendously from public attention, leading to a nervous breakdown most 
likely caused by all the unwanted attention.  He escaped publicity by moving 
away and starting a private simple life (working with adding machines and 
other simple tasks) instead of being the genius professor at Harvard and 
granting the world great scientific achievements.26  However, the media kept 
on haunting him for many years and eventually published an article titled 
Where Are They Now? featuring Sidis as “the unwilling subject of a brief bio-
graphical sketch and cartoon printed in The New Yorker weekly maga-
zine.”27  Sidis brought suit against The New Yorker.  The Supreme Court de-
nied a writ of certiorari to review an opinion of the Second Circuit that set 
forth the doctrine of the permanent public figure, which has not dramatical-
ly changed over the years since.28  In the Second Circuit opinion, Sidis was 
dismissed as a public figure with no right to challenge personal publicity.  
Judge Charles Edward Clark expressed sympathy for Sidis, who claimed 
that the publication had exposed him to “public scorn, ridicule, and con-
tempt”29 and caused him mental problems—but found that the court cannot 
give “all of the intimate details of private life an absolute immunity from the 
prying of the press” based on the high value placed on freedom of speech.30 
The cases that address public figures have done little over the last centu-
ry to change the problematic concept of the permanency of public figure 
status with its attendant lack of privacy protection.  “One who has achieved 
public figure status finds it nearly impossible to shed.  More importantly, 
the retention of public figure status presents incredible hurdles for defama-
tion and privacy plaintiffs.”31 
 
 23 Id. 
 24  Samantha Barbas, The Sidis Case and the Origins of Modern Privacy Law, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 21, 
26 (2012). 
 25  Olympia R. Duhart, When Time Stands Still: An Argument for Restoring Public Figures to Private Status, 27 
NOVA L. REV. 365, 365, 382 (2002). 
 26 Barbas, supra note 24, at 21.  
 27 Sidis, 113 F.2d at 807.  
 28 Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 311 U.S. 711, 711 (1940) (denying certiorari); see also Barbas, supra note 
24, at 66–67. 
 29  GINI GRAHAM SCOTT, THE DEATH OF PRIVACY: THE BATTLE FOR PERSONAL PRIVACY IN 
THE COURTS, THE MEDIA, AND SOCIETY 148 (2011) (citation omitted). 
 30 Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809; Duhart, supra note 25, at 366–67, 384–85 (discussing the problem of priva-
cy of one-time public figures and presenting a test for restoring them to private status). 
 31 Duhart, supra note 25, at 384–85; see also Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809. 
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Over the years the U.S. Supreme Court has added to its definition of 
public figures.  Starting with the Gertz case and in cases that followed, the 
Court considered several components to arrive at the definition of a public 
figure.32  The Court construed the definition case by case with different fig-
ures, developing a few main components of its definition of a public figure:  
First, access and control over the media.  
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the 
channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic oppor-
tunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy.  
Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state inter-
est in protecting them is correspondingly greater.33 
Second, enrollment in a special role in the public eye.  “Public Figures are per-
sons holding public office and/or using public resources and, more broadly 
speaking, all those who play a role in public life, whether in politics, the 
economy, the arts, the social sphere, sport, or in any other domain.”34 
An individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept certain nec-
essary consequences of that involvement in public affairs.  He runs the risk of 
closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case.  And society’s interest 
in the officers of government is not strictly limited to the formal discharge of of-
ficial duties . . . . Those classified as public figures stand in a similar position.35  
According to the Court’s analysis in Gertz, Gertz did not meet this se-
cond component of the test.  Neither did he have access to media in the 
manner that public figures and officials usually enjoy, nor had he invited 
the risk of publication, associated with close public scrutiny.  Being an at-
torney, he did not discuss the case with the media and therefore lacked the 
opportunity to rebut claims.36 
 
 32 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 325, 344–45 (1974) (discussing 1968 case in which a 
Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot and killed a youth).  Elmer Gertz, a famous Chicago at-
torney, had been hired by the victim’s family for their case against the police.  Id. at 325.  Gertz’s 
role in the civil suit against the police officer prompted an article in the American Opinion, 
which accused Gertz of being “an architect of [a] ‘frame-up’” of policeman Nuccio and stated 
that Gertz had a criminal record, labeled Gertz “Leninist” with longstanding communist affilia-
tion, and claimed he was an official of the “Marxist League for Industrial Democracy.”  Id. at 
326.  The statements contained serious inaccuracies and falsehoods.  Gertz sued for libel.  Id. at 
327.  For additional discussion of some of the Court’s considerations in Gertz, see also Ernest D. 
Giglio, Unwanted Publicity, the News Media, and the Constitution: Where Privacy Rights Compete with the 
First Amendment, 12 AKRON L. REV. 229, 238 (1978).  And for explanation as to why injury to of-
ficial reputation is not protected, as well as considerations weighing in favor of and against limit-
ing liability of news outlets, see GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 139, 143 
(1999). 
 33 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. 
 34 Eur. Parl. Ass., Right to Privacy, 24th Sess., Res. No. 1165 (1998); Shackelford, supra note 7, at 128. 
 35 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344–345; Carol Anne Been, Note, Public Status Over Time: A Single Approach to the 
Retention Problem in Defamation and Privacy Law, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 951, 954–55 (“[A] public fig-
ure is one who has assumed a role of special prominence in society and thus invites public scruti-
ny and the accompanying risks.”). 
 36 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 (affirming the trial court’s refusal to characterize Gertz as a public figure.) 
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Third, willingly (voluntarily) choosing to engage in a public role, inviting invasion of 
privacy risks.37  “[T]hose classed as public figures have thrust themselves to 
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the res-
olution of the issues involved,” thereby inviting “attention and comment.”38 
The ethics code of professional journalists cautions: “Realize that pri-
vate people have a greater right to control information about themselves 
than public figures and others who seek power, influence or attention.”39  Conse-
quently, media must weigh the consequences of publishing or broadcasting 
personal information. 
Rape victims are an excellent example of figures that, although meeting 
the criterion of enrollment in a special role in the public eye, neither meet 
the criterion of willingly (voluntarily) choosing the engagement in a public role nor of 
having control over the media (like a president candidate).  Therefore, a deci-
sion holding that a rape victim’s claim of invasion of privacy against a 
newspaper for publishing her name was barred by the First Amendment is, 
in our view, erroneous.40 
Fourth, public controversy.  Discussing a publication about the divorce of 
Russell Firestone, a member of one of America’s wealthiest families, the 
Court held that the issue of the dissolution of a marriage was not a type of 
“public controversy” and therefore would be considered a private rather 
than public figure.41 
We claim that these definitions are too broad and in many ways lack le-
gitimacy because they don’t distinguish between “true” public figures and 
any others.  In the present scheme, everyone has potential to be considered, 
in one way or another, a public figure.  Instead, we suggest that a person is 
a public figure if he or she meets the criteria as one who may influence the 
public in general or any group per se.  General interest in a public figure is 
a measure of the potential influence this figure has, or might have, on the 
public.42  A variety of reasons might arouse interest in the public figure, 
 
 37 See id. at 345. 
 38 Id. 
 39 SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS (Sept. 6, 2014, 4:49 PM), 
https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (emphasis added).  
 40 See Fla. Star v. B. J. F., 491 U.S. 524, 535–36 (1989).  It is also wrong based on the proportionali-
ty test. 
 41 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 450-55 (1976) (holding that Time magazine erroneously 
reported that the divorce was granted on the grounds of adultery).  Mrs. Firestone sued the mag-
azine for libel.  Id. at 452.  Part of the final judgment alluded to wild allegations that surfaced dur-
ing divorce proceedings: testimony given on the defendant’s behalf described the plaintiff’s “ex-
tramarital escapades” that “were bizarre and of an amatory nature which would have made Dr. 
Freud’s hair curl.”  Id. at 450; see also Duhart, supra note 25, at 374–75 (noting that the Time, Inc. 
Court “rejected the public status of the plaintiff, applying the controversy standard”). 
 42 For different definitions, see KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at 859–60 (“A public fig-
ure . . . . includes . . . anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused upon 
him as a person.”). 
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such as his or her achievements, reputation, lifestyle, profession, and posi-
tion or role in the public eye.  These facts can give the public a legitimate 
interest in learning more details about the public figure, including his or her 
comments, omissions, activities, habits and behavior (or misbehavior).43 
We contend that the interest in access to private information about pub-
lic figures is legitimized by cumulative factors: (1) the public figure’s poten-
tial influence (whether direct or indirect) on members of the public, and (2) 
the value and impact of the information on the public if exposed.  We claim 
that when the data is relevant, the public has a legitimate right to know this 
information.  We further argue that in the U.S., the “right to know” and 
freedom of speech generally override public figures’ right to privacy.  In the 
case of a conflict between the two, revealing more traditionally private in-
formation than one normally would have is justified.  Still, one has to des-
ignate some limits to avoid publication of data regarding public figures that 
do not meet certain criteria, such as the relevancy of the information. 
The broadest definition of a public figure identifies everyone as having the 
potential to become a public figure at any point in one’s life.44  Public fig-
ures include not only people with a high probability of becoming public 
figures, such as political candidates or party members, but potentially each 
and every one of us.45  However, our discussion will focus only on currently 
existing public figures.  We do so to differentiate among the norms which 
apply to true public figures versus those that apply to every person, as we 
think privacy should be adjusted to account for the special features of public 
figures and cannot be implemented on everyone in advance.  We do claim 
that the status of an existing public figure compared to the status of an 
anonymous person that may or may not become a public figure one day is 
totally different from the privacy perspective.  The protection of privacy, on 
the one hand, and the waiver of privacy for the purpose of public interest, 
 
 43 Cason v. Baskin, 30 So. 2d 635, 638 (Fla. 1947) (en banc) (“It is true that a person who, by his 
accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the 
public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, may be said to have be-
come a public personage, and to that extent he thereby relinquishes at least a part of his right of 
privacy.”).  In Cason, the court found that Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings Baskin, author of The Year-
ling, “reasonably believed that the public would be interested in her autobiography,” which cov-
ered the period of her life in rural Florida.  Id. at 637. 
 44 See Aaron Larson, Defamation: Libel and Slander, EXPERTLAW.COM (Nov. 9 2014), 
http://www.expertlaw.com/library/personal_injury/defamation.html#3 (“A person can become 
an ‘involuntary public figure’ as the result of publicity, even though that person did not want or 
invite the public attention . . . . A person can also become a ‘limited public figure’ by engaging in 
actions which generate publicity within a narrow area of interest.”). 
 45 Ordinary people may become “involuntary public figures” when they take part in an event or 
occurrence of public significance, such as a crime, an accident, or a spontaneous act of heroism.  
See 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood § 141 (2005) (“An individual may achieve such 
pervasive fame or notoriety that he or she becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all con-
texts, provided that he or she has a pervasive involvement in the affairs of society.”). 
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on the other hand, function differently for public figures and non-public 
figures, who might (or might not) become public figures in the future.  Hav-
ing said that, we welcome future discussions about anonymous people turn-
ing into public figures as a special category requiring different norms with 
respect to the matter of privacy in various cases. 
As the next step toward understanding privacy within the context of the 
public interest or “right to know” private information about public figures, 
we need to define the term “private information.” 
B.  What Information Should Stay Private for Public Figures? 
The definitions of private information with respect to the discourse about 
the public figures’ right to privacy range from broad to narrow.  At the 
broad end of the spectrum, “[i]nformation should be regarded as being ‘per-
sonal information’ if it is information about a natural person from which, or 
by use of which, the person can be identified,”46 while the narrow end of the 
spectrum includes more specific data about a person that is not usually ex-
posed to the public, such as credit history47 or sexual information.48 
All relevant definitions we use in this paper should comply with Parker’s 
threshold of the three criteria: true, simple, and useful.49  They should also 
comport with the five tests Parker enumerated: “(1) whether a person has 
lost or gained privacy, (2) whether he should lose or gain privacy, (3) whether 
he knows that he has lost or gained privacy, (4) whether he approves or disap-
proves of the loss or gain, and (5) how he experiences that loss or gain.”50 
While concerns about information privacy abound, this paper’s narrow 
focus is on the public interest in accessing private information about public 
figures.  Accordingly, we refer to information that can be grouped into the 
following primary categories: medical information, criminal information, 
sexual information, financial information, identifying information (home 
address, family status, social activities), and misbehavior.  The dissemina-
tion of any of these types of details about a public figure may violate his or 
her balloon of privacy, in favor of the public’s right to gain access to this in-
formation, which we define as private. 
 
 46 2 COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA LAW REFORM COMMISSION, PRIVACY, § 1198 (1983). 
 47 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4) (2012) (“There is a need to insure that consum-
er reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect 
for the consumer’s right to privacy.”). 
 48 See 38 States + DC Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, 
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ (last visited May 2, 2017) (listing 38 states 
that have revenge porn statutes). 
 49 See Richard B. Parker, A Definition Of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 275, 277 (1974) (prescrib-
ing characteristics that to which definitions of privacy should aspire). 
 50 Id. at 278. 
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This definition is important to our model, which aims to formulate a 
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate private information on pub-
lic figures.  Before addressing the model and applying it to cases, however, 
we must explain the origins of privacy law in the U.S. that gave rise to pre-
sent legal rules about public figures, which, in our opinion, is not applicable 
as is in the current digital era. 
III.  THE LAW OF PRIVACY FOR PUBLIC FIGURES 
A.  The U.S. Attitude Toward Privacy—The Constitutional Roots 
1.  The U.S Constitutional Origin—First Amendment Freedom Of Expression 
Privacy as a legal concept has been recognized by many scholars as 
“elusive and ill defined.”51  According to Daniel Solove, the multitude of 
definitions produced by scholars can be narrowed down to six basic con-
ceptions of privacy, including: “(1) the right to be let alone; (2) limited ac-
cess to the self; (3) secrecy; (4) control of personal information; (5) person-
hood; and (6) intimacy.”52  The definition of privacy for the purposes of this 
Article focuses on the psychological aspects of the term and, more specifi-
cally, the perceived personal “balloon,” or sphere of a private zone, that 
centers on themes such as autonomy, freedom, and creating relationships.53  
Accordingly, this paper will conceptualize privacy in a unique way by rely-
ing on the conceptual balloon of privacy that surrounds each and every one 
of us, including public figures. 
We claim that privacy as a right was first recognized by the U.S. in a 
case involving the publication of private details about public figures 
weighed against the public interest in exposure of this information.  The fo-
cus of this U.S. approach to privacy in general and with respect to public 
figures’ publicity is based on the freedom of speech, the right to know and 
 
 51 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 393 (1978) (“The concept of 
‘privacy’ is elusive and ill defined.  Much ink has been spilled in trying to clarify its meaning.”); see 
also James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures Of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 
1151, 1154-55 (2004) (explaining that privacy is embarrassingly difficult to define and that it dif-
fers strangely from one culture, seemingly undermining the importance of keeping privacy as a 
goal to protect personhood). 
 52 Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1094 (2002). 
 53 See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, To Read or Not to Read: Privacy Within Social Networks, the Entitlement of 
Employees to a Virtual “Private Zone,” and the Balloon Theory, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 53, 80–86 (2014) (in-
troducing balloon theory for the first time); see also PAUL BERNAL, INTERNET PRIVACY RIGHTS: 
RIGHTS TO PROTECT AUTONOMY 8–9 (2014) (claiming that individuals gain autonomy to the 
extent that they hold rights to control personal data and explaining that the internet poses chal-
lenges to individual control over such data) privacy in many ways but it can be controlled if we 
will be aware of the importance of); infra Part IV.A. 
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have access to information, the importance of the media and freedom of 
the press, a perspective favoring the public and democratic values against 
restricting discourse.54  This aspect was not emphasized in the famous 1890 
Harvard Law Review article, The Right to Privacy by Louis Brandeis and 
Samuel Warren.55  What inspired that article remains unknown, but it has 
been suggested that Warren was particularly displeased by newspaper arti-
cles revealing details of his wedding to the daughter of a senator.56  Follow-
ing the famous article’s publication, the U.S. legal system has recognized 
privacy as an enforceable legal right. 
The general legal origin of privacy rights in the U.S. is grounded in the 
Fourth Amendment, which entitles people to the right “to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”57  
The Fourteenth Amendment provided a different form of privacy when it 
served as the justification for women’s rights to control their own bodies.58 
The constitutional basis to privacy seems to conflict with another very 
important U.S. constitutional right—the freedom of expression.  The U.S. 
cherishes the First Amendment, which protects freedom of expression, as 
fundamental to American liberty.59  Freedom of expression permits free 
 
 54 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press . . . .”); Shackelford, supra note 7, at 126 (positing that, as compared to Europe, the 
deep U.S. commitment to free speech, different understandings of the public interest, and varying 
legal cultures account for divergent understandings of privacy rights). 
 55 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 219–20 
(1890) (arguing that individual Americans have an enforceable privacy right and that “the protec-
tion of society must come mainly through a recognition of the rights of the individual”). 
 56 See Amy Gajda, What if Samuel D. Warren Hadn’t Married A Senator’s Daughter?: Uncovering The Press 
Coverage That Led To The Right to Privacy 2–3 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Papers Series, 
Research Paper No. 07-06, 2007) (explaining that coverage of Warren’s marriage to his wife 
“may have . . . helped spark Warren and Brandeis’s The Right to Privacy”); see also William L. 
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960) (describing journalists’ interest in Warren’s 
wife’s personal affairs); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 966–967 (1964) (explaining that the source of Warren’s frustra-
tion was “lurid newspaper gossip”). 
 57 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); see also JEFFREY ROSEN, THE 
UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 5 (2000) (proposing that 
Warren and Brandeis believed citizens’ privacy right to not have their sex lives reported on by 
gossip columnists was an extension of the broader right to be let alone).  United States v. Johns, 
469 U.S. 478, 487–88 (1985) (holding that a law enforcement search of packages can be permis-
sible so long as the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights are not adversely affected). 
 58 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (articulating that “per-
sonal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rear-
ing, and education” involve “the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a life-
time, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 59 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
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publication and (almost) free access to knowledge.60  The First Amendment 
was the basis for many Supreme Court decisions enabling almost all publi-
cations about public figures.61  At first glance, freedom of expression nearly 
overrides privacy rights and significantly minimizes the privacy regime.62  
In his book Intellectual Privacy, Neil Richards discusses the relationship be-
tween privacy and freedom of speech.63  When these two are in conflict, 
freedom of speech will win because of the importance of free speech to 
open societies.64  However, Richards suggests that speech and privacy are 
actually rarely in conflict.  For example, while celebrity gossip might be a 
price to pay for free speech, the privacy of ordinary citizens can be up-
held.65  
2.  Diverse Attitudes and Different Sources of Privacy  
A different attitude with respect to privacy rights is reflected by Europe-
an Law.  Evidently, Continental Europeans and Americans perceive privacy 
quite differently.  In fact, there is a significant conflict between the European 
personal dignity approach to privacy, which emphasizes a right to one’s im-
age, name, and reputation and a right to control one’s public image and 
shield against unwanted public exposure, versus the liberal U.S. approach, 
emphasizing personal liberty (as it pertains to state control), and focusing on 
freedom of speech and freedom of expression.66  The “prime enemy” of the 
 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances.”). 
 60 See Anupam Chander & Uye ̂n P. ee ̂, Free Speech, 100 IOWA L. REV. 501, 508–24 (2015) (explain-
ing how the constitionally protected right to free speech has enabled the Internet to be a promi-
nent source for free publication without censorship). 
 61 See, e.g., Amy Kristin Sanders, Fast Forward Fifty Years: Protecting Uninhibited, Robust and Wide-Open 
Debate After New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 48 GA. L. REV. 843, 847–48 (2014) (profiling a 
number of cases where application of the First Amendment altered the standard for determining 
the privacy rights of public figures). 
 62 See AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI THREATEN 
A FREE PRESS 29–32 (2015) (highlighting the broad latitude given to news organizations to pub-
lish information). 
 63 NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE 95–108 (2015) (discussing the relationship between privacy and freedom of speech and argu-
ing that the concept of “intellectual privacy” can make privacy and speech compatible). 
 64 See id. at 103 (“All Western societies share a foundational commitment to the freedom of speech 
on public matters—a belief that new ideas should be aired and given their say.”) 
 65 See id. at 107–08 (arguing that restrictions on surveillance of private rights further free speech 
rights because they allow individuals to form new ideas without fear of publicity). 
 66 See Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2092 (2001) (explaining the dis-
tinction between personal dignity and personal autonomy); Whitman, supra note 51, at 1155–56, 
1160–61 (describing different habits that reflect the different attitudes toward privacy, such as the 
U.S. habit to share information about private matters with strangers and even ask questions 
about salaries, in a way which is “‘difficult to imagine’ for northern Europeans or Asians,” and 
explaining that Continental law is avidly protective of privacy in many realms of life).  For a 
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Continental conception is the media, whereas the media is the liberal Amer-
icans’ most important tool for ensuring free expression.67  “To people accus-
tomed to the [Continental attitude toward privacy], American law seems to 
tolerate relentless and brutal violations of privacy in” many aspects of life.68  
Europe, in addition to many countries around the world, recognizes privacy 
as a firmly rooted fundamental right.69  The different attitudes are reflected 
also with respect to posting information and pictures about public figures.  
For example, the circulation of nude photos of celebrities on the Internet has 
produced a conflict, with European courts alone acting to penalize Internet 
service providers.70  Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights is one of the strongest milestones in protecting individuals’ private in-
formation in Europe.71  The differences between the European and Ameri-
can approaches to the right to be forgotten mirror of the differnces between 
the European and U.S. approach to privacy.72  To summarize this point, as 
Yale professor James Q. Whitman stated, “American privacy law seems, 
from the European point of view, simply to have ‘failed.’”73 
The right to privacy also appears in many international documents.74  
For example, Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and repu-
tation.  Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such in-
terference or attacks.”75  Additionally, Article 8 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights states:  
 
comparative view of approaches to workplace privacy, see Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 53, at 96-
99. 
 67 Whitman, supra note 51, at 1161. 
 68 Id. at 1156 (“Europeans grow visibly angry, for example, about routine American practices like 
credit reporting.”).  Grounding his argument in historical fact, Whitman explains that the dignity 
approach is the result of a revolt against the privilege of high status persons, who could protect 
their personal honor in Continental courts of the aristocratic and monarchial societies of old Eu-
rope.  Id. at 1165–66. 
 69 See 2000 O.J. (C 326) 10, art. 7 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and fami-
ly life, home and communications.”).  Article 8 of the EU Charter extends Article 7’s right to pri-
vacy to the protection of personal data, which sets the EU Charter apart from other major hu-
man rights documents.  Id. at art. 8 (1) (“Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning him or her.”). 
 70 See Whitman, supra note 51, at 1196–201 (describing European protection of individuals who ap-
pear nude in public). 
 71 The Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Article 8, (entered 
into force Sep. 3, 1953)(outlining the right to respect for private and family life for all Europeans). 
 72 See supra Part III.A.1. 
 73 Whitman, supra note 51, at 1157. 
 74 See, e.g., LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA PRIVACY LAW: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 99-107 
(2014) (discussing international tools in Europe and comparing national data privacy laws around 
the world). 
 75 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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(1)  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
 and his correspondence.  
(2)  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.76   
And finally, Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 1966, states: “1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to un-
lawful attacks on his honour and reputation.  2. Everyone has the right to 
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”77 
As seen above, the right to privacy has different meanings, different 
sources and different definitions.78  Starting more than 100 years ago with 
Warren and Brandeis’s “right to be left alone,”79 the diverse features of pri-
vacy have been highlighted by the continued dialogue as to its meaning by 
courts and scholars alike. 
 
 76 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.  For a 
discussion on the meaning of private life under the treaty, see IVANA ROAGNA, COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE HUMAN RIGHTS HANDBOOKS: PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE 
AND FAMILY LIFE UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 12 (2012), 
http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/Roagna2012_EN.pdf (“The Strasbourg Court has never 
offered a clear and precise definition of what is meant by private life: in its view it is a broad con-
cept, incapable of exhaustive definition . . . . [T]he notion of private life is much wider than that 
of privacy, encompassing a sphere within which every individual can freely develop and fulfil his 
personality, both in relation to others and with the outside world.  Instead of providing a clear-
cut definition of private life, the Court has identified, on a case-by-case basis, the situations falling 
within this dimension.  The result is a rather vague concept, which the Court tends to construe 
and interpret broadly . . . .”). 
 77 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,  
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf. 
 78 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it 
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person . . . .”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 483 (1965) (“[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from gov-
ernmental intrusion.”); Park Univ. Enters. v. Am. Cas. Co., 442 F.3d 1239, 1250 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(“[I]n layman’s terms, ‘[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of privacy includes the right to be left 
alone.’” (quoting Park Univ. Enters. V. Am. Cas. Co., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1110 (D. Kan. 
2004)); Patricia Sanchez Abril, Selling Privacy, in THE INFORMATION ERA AND ADVANCED 
TECHNOLOGY: NEW CHALLENGES IN PRIVACY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Shlomit 
Yanisky-Ravid ed., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 6), http://www.alsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/NP-2014-Selling-Privacy-Abril.pdf (“In general, privacy law can be 
defined as the government’s ability to restrict the penetration into one’s private space and the use, 
transfer, or disclosure of certain personal information.”). 
 79 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 55, at 193. 
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Theoretical justifications of privacy can be divided into a few schools of 
thought: Law and Economics, Distributive Justice, Feminist Theory, and 
Personality and Psychological Reasoning.80 
Whereas Professor Posner wrote about economic value, the importance 
of privacy rights, and avoiding misuse in order to maintain trust, other 
scholars have focused on psychological aspects of privacy.81  The Balloon 
Theory, which we rely on, describes privacy as a psychological bundle of 
feelings and beliefs.82  This psychological state creates a zone surrounding 
the person where one keeps and protects his thoughts, emotions, and acts 
from interference by others in the public domain.  Among other risks and 
harms caused by an invasion of someone’s privacy is the detriment to per-
sonality traits like autonomy, freedom, dignity, and mental health.  People 
whose privacy has been invaded and who have had personal information 
used against them have often experienced mental injury and helplessness.83 
American scholars have argued that the idea behind privacy is the control 
of one’s public image, name, and reputation over public disclosure of infor-
mation about oneself.84  The media plays an important role.  Whereas the Eu-
ropeans consider the media the greatest enemy of privacy in the sense of keep-
ing one’s dignity and controlling one’s public image – the media in the U.S. 
liberty regime is one of the most significant democratic tools for exposing in-
formation and for control and criticism of governmental acts and actors. 
 
 80 See generally Sanchez-Abril, supra note 78; Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 
421 (1980); see also Judith DeCew, Privacy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2015), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/privacy (presenting several scholars’ argu-
ments on the theory of privacy in the law). 
 81 See DeCew, supra note 80. 
 82 See Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 53, at 83–86 (establishing a “balloon theory” of personal privacy as 
a private sphere—analogous to an “intangible ‘baloon’”—which bundles one’s psychological 
perceptions and emotions, and constantly and permanently surround one’s persona wherever one 
goes—including within the public domain and digital media).  
 83 See, e.g., Post, supra note 66, at 2087 (discussing the “sense of violation” Monica Lewinsky must 
have felt when her private sexual life was “forcibly made public”); see also James P. Nehf, Recogniz-
ing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2003) (describing the sense 
of helplessness that results when strangers collect and have the ability to use private information 
against an individual (citing Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for 
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1419–23 (2001) (invoking the story of Joseph K. in, 
FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., 1937), as a metaphor to conceptualize 
problems with collecting mass data about individuals))). 
 84 See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, 
MANAGEMENT 51 (1995) (describing the origins of individual tort claims for the invansion of the 
right of privacy and that the modern tort has “evolved into . . . branches,” including “unreasona-
ble publicity given to another’s private life, appropriation of another’s name or likeness, and pub-
licity that unreasonably places another in a false light before the public”); see also THOMAS 
NAGEL, CONCEALMENT AND EXPOSURE: AND OTHER ESSAYS 4 (2002) (arguing that having 
control over the boundry between what people share and what they conceal is one of the most 
important attributes of humanity). 
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This notion is amplified significantly in the development and expansion 
of the Internet in our digital age and has become most relevant to online 
publications about public figures.85 
B.  The Loss Of Privacy for Public Figures in the U.S. 
1.   Public Figures Have (Almost) No Privacy Rights in the U.S.: The History Of 
Supreme Court Decisions Establishing the Superiority Rule of Freedom of 
Expression 
In a jurisdiction based on free speech, free media, the right of the public 
to know and democratic legal norms protecting the citizenry from govern-
mental interference, we should not be surprised that the legal system sancti-
fies the old and the new media.  Unfortunately, when discussing privacy 
(within the privacy discourse) the media (and the public interest to know) 
have become the great enemy of the value of privacy.  The more advanced 
the technology, the less privacy may flourish.86  To understand the legal cur-
rent situation in the digital era for the purpose of suggesting a new model, we 
first have to understand the legal ruling regarding public figures in general. 
The first milestone in the discourse on public figures within the U.S. 
was the Supreme Court case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.87  The history of 
public figures and the law is rooted in the analysis of this landmark decision 
of 1964.88  The ruling provided guidelines and set forth the legal norm ad-
dressing the conflict between the right to know, freedom of speech, and the 
right of publicity on the one hand and the rights to privacy and to recover 
compensation against defamation on the other hand.89 
Sullivan was one of three elected Commissioners in charge of the police 
of the City of Montgomery Alabama. He brought a civil libel action against 
the New York Times.  The circuit court of Montgomery awarded him 
damages of $500,000, the full amount claimed, and the Supreme Court of 
 
 85 As Whitman argues, this amplification has been spurred on by the free market.  Whitman, supra 
note 51, at 1171. 
 86 See Shackelford, supra note 7, at 127 (claiming that technological advances are “causing socie-
ties . . . to rethink the bounds of privacy rights”). 
 87 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 88 L. B. Sullivan, one of three elected Commissioners in Montgomery Alabama, and who was in 
charge of the police department, claimed that an advertisement in the New York Times titled 
“Heed Their Rising Voices,” which called attention to civil rights violations in the South, re-
ferred to him by the word “police.”  Id. at 256–58.  The publication did not mention Sullivan’s 
name but included descriptions of brutal violence against a peacefully protesting Dr. Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr., including the bombing of his home, which almost killed his wife and child, as well 
as claims that Dr. King was arrested seven times and was charged with a felony which carried a 
ten-year prison sentence.  Id. at 257–58. 
 89 See Duhart, supra note 25, at 367 (stating that N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan “set the framework of me-
dia law unique to public officials and, subsequently, public figures”). 
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Alabama affirmed.  The New York Times appealed.90  The case was about 
a paid advertisement, entitled “Heed Their Rising Voices.”91  Names were 
not mentioned but the word “police” identified Sullivan as the head of the 
police department.  Sullivan, however, made no efforts to prove that he suf-
fered actual damages or loss as a result of the alleged libel.92 
Although the Court admitted that some of the statements were inaccu-
rate,93 it reversed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that the First 
Amendment provides safeguards for freedom of speech and the press.94  
The Court held that the need to criticize public officials should be protected 
and that journalists should not give pause for fear of defamation lawsuits.  
Free speech as a national interest hence prevailed, placing a limitation on 
defamation cases brought by officials.95  According to the Supreme Court, 
“debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, 
and . . . it may well include . . . unpleasantly sharp attacks on government 
and public officials.”96  Therefore, public officials could not recover damag-
es “for a defamatory falsehood relating to [their] official conduct [without 
proof] that the statement was made with ‘actual malice,’” meaning that the 
statement was made (1) “with knowledge that it was false,” or (2) “with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”97  This means that simple 
negligence is not enough for public officials to recover from defamation by 
the press.  Therefore, with such a high burden “the Court made it extreme-
ly difficult if not impossible for such officials to prevail in libel actions 
against media defendants.”98  The result is that critics of public officials are 
 
 90 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256–58.  
 91 Id. at 257–58 (quoting the advertisement, which stated: “Again and again the Southern violators 
have answered Dr. King’s peaceful protests with intimidation and violence.  They have bombed 
his home almost killing his wife and child.  They have assaulted his person.  They have arrested 
him seven times—for ‘speeding,’ ‘loitering’ and similar ‘offenses.’  And now they have charged 
him with ‘perjury’—a felony under which they could imprison him for ten years. . . .”).  The adver-
tisement cost about $4,800 to publish.  Id. at 260. 
 92  Id. at 262. 
 93 Id. at 258–59 (“It is uncontroverted that some of the statements contained in the two paragraphs 
were not accurate descriptions of events which occurred in Montgomery . . . . Dr. King had not 
been arrested seven times, but only four.”); see also Duhart, supra note 25, at 368 (explaining that 
although the Court knew inaccurate statements had been made, it based its decision on more im-
portant policy considerations). 
 94 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264. 
 95 Usman, supra note 12, at 951–52 (describing the balancing process the Supreme Court used to 
construct the constitutional framework for adjudicating defamation actions). 
 96 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. 
 97 Id. at 279–80 (Which states, “The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that 
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his offi-
cial conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with “actual malice”—that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”). 
 98 Elsa Ransom, The Ex-Public Figure: A Libel Plaintiff Without a Class, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 389, 
392 (1995); see also Usman, supra note 12, at 961, n.76 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271–72 (quot-
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not threatened by defamation cases,  even when the publication contains 
lies.99  Journalists were given extra leeway with respect to coverage of public 
officials, the main takeaway of this decision about defamation cases being 
that simple negligence in journalism—even that which resulted in false 
statements—does not give rise to liability in a defamation suit brought by 
public officials.100 
There are some justifications behind this generosity towards journalists, 
among them: principles of free speech and press; the public’s right to know 
and the need to criticize the government; fear of a chilling effect or self-
censorship by the media;101 and promotion of racial equality.  However, 
voices against the decision expressed concerns about the promotion of 
journalistic abuse and misconduct; the exposure of public officials to 
blackmail; and the risk of exposure creating a deterrent to people consider-
ing public service.102 
To those critics, we would add that the New York Times decision harms the 
right of privacy for public figures by nullifying their legitimate balloons entirely. 
After Sullivan, public figures simply lost their privacy in the U.S.  Many 
cases have shown how very far courts are willing to go without finding 
“reckless disregard.”  Just four years after New York Times, the Supreme 
Court found that failure to investigate or seek any corroboration before 
publishing an allegation does not rise to the level of reckless disregard for 
the truth.103  The first cases to follow New York Times were all about public 
officials.  However, it did not take long for courts broaden the norm to in-
clude also public figures in the broader sense.  Among many others are Cur-
 
ing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963))) (showing that the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
Court’s ruling utilized language from the opinion in NAACP v. Button). 
 99 See Usman, supra note 12, at 961 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280). 
100 See Duhart, supra note 25, at 368 (explaining that this resulted from the Supreme Court giving 
priority to the existence of a robust free press). 
101 See Kermit L. Hall, Justice Brennan and Cultural History: New York Times v. Sullivan and Its Times, 
27 CAL. W. L. REV. 339, 351 n.67 (1991) (stating that lawsuits against the New York Times “repre-
sented a threat to the paper’s balance sheet and, even more important, a chilling of its coverage 
of the civil rights movement,” and noting that plaintiffs sought, in total, $5,600,000 in damages). 
102 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong? 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782, 
817 (1986) (“On balance, the common law rules of defamation (sensibly controlled on the ques-
tion of damages) represent a better reconciliation of the dual claims of freedom of speech and the 
protection of individual reputation than does the New York Times rule that has replaced it.”); see al-
so Duhart, supra note 25, at 369–70 (stating that some critics of the New York Times decision 
claimed it “invites journalistic misconduct” and “will drive capable persons away from govern-
ment service”). 
103 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732–33 (1968); see also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991) (holding that the First Amendment protects deliberate alteration of 
quotes so long as “the alteration [does not] result[ ] in a material change in the meaning con-
veyed by the statement”); Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 658 
(1989) (reiterating that “a public figure plaintiff must prove more than an extreme departure from 
professional standards . . . [in order to] provide a sufficient basis for finding actual malice”). 
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tis Publishing Co. v. Butts.104  This time the Court discussed a figure who did 
not necessarily meet the criterion of a public officials (unlike Sullivan).  First-
ly, the plaintiff was a famous football coach, James Wallace Butts Jr. (Wally 
Butts). Secondly, he was a Georgia University athletic director and as such 
was paid from private funds; therefore, he was a private employee and not 
a state one.105  Butts filed a libel suit against Curtis Publishing after an arti-
cle published in The Saturday Evening Post falsely accused him of “fixing” a 
football game.106  The ultimate outcome of this case, and others to follow, 
was that First Amendment law as to public officials was extended to public 
figures who play no role in government.107 
U.S. courts explicitly went on, expanding the N.Y. Times v. Sullivan case 
to public figures.  In Associated Press v. Walker, a libel claim was brought by a 
man accused of inciting a riot against federal marshals.108  The plaintiff, 
who was a national military figure with his own following (the “Friends of 
Walker),” was still not deemed a public official at the time the false news 
dispatch was released about him.  According to the dispatch, Walker led 
opposition to federal efforts to enforce court ordered desegregation at the 
University of Mississippi.109  Walker sued the publisher for libel, claiming 
the publication was false.110 
In deciding Butts and Walker, the Supreme Court expanded the already 
broad definition of public official stated in New York Times v. Sullivan to an 
even broader one, expanding press protection to its coverage of any public 
figure.  The borders between governmental and private sector thus gradual-
ly blurred.111 
 
104 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 161 (1967) (Harlan, J., plurality opinion, announcing 
the judgments of the Court), aff’g 351 F.2d 702, aff’g Butts v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 242 F. Supp 390 
(N.D. Ga. 1964). 
105 Id. at 135–36; Usman, supra note 12, at 962. 
106 Butts, 388 U.S. at 135–37.  Butts sued for 10 million dollars, but the initial jury award was for 
$3,060,000.  Id. at 137–38. 
107 Duhart, supra note 25, at 372–73. 
108 See Butts, 388 U.S. at 140.  The Supreme Court combined the Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and As-
sociated Press v. Walker cases and issued a single opinion.  Id. at 130 n.*. 
109 Id. at 140 (“[A] massive riot erupted because of federal efforts to enforce a court decree ordering 
the enrollment of a Negro, James Meredith, as a student in the University.  The dispatch stated 
that respondent Walker, who was present on the campus, had taken command of the violent 
crowd and had personally led a charge against federal marshals sent there to effectuate the 
court’s decree and to assist in preserving order.  It also described Walker as encouraging rioters to 
use violence and giving them technical advice on combating the effects of tear gas.”); Duhart, su-
pra note 25, at 371–372. 
110 Butts, 388 U.S. at 140. 
111 See Butts, 388 U.S. at 140, 155; Duhart, supra note 25, at 372 n.42 (“Today, public figures and 
public officials are nearly impossible to distinguish.  With presidential candidates routinely ap-
pearing on late-night entertainment shows, it seems there is almost no difference at all between 
officials and celebrities.”). 
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The distinction made between a public figure and private figures is crit-
ical to the outcome of a case sounding in libel.112 
The many decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding public figures 
have established a rule in which the right of privacy has become a subordi-
nate right to competing rights, such as freedom of expression, freedom of 
speech, and the right to know.  However, as will be discussed below, our 
approach is different and calls for undermining the total superiority of these 
rights against the privacy right even within the discourse on public figures. 
2.  Rethinking Supreme Court Privacy Subordinate Standpoint 
This article offers a new angle on privacy in trying to find the private 
figure (with its balloon of privacy) within the public figure, claiming the dis-
tinction is not a “black and white” decision. 
Our approach to the issue of reasonable publication about public fig-
ures differs from the U.S. norm for several reasons.  First, the Supreme 
Court rules on public figures were shaped according to defamation law and 
the expansive freedoms given by the First Amendment; we would analyze 
those cases from the perspective that prizes the value of privacy.  The justi-
fications to the U.S. rulings do not, most of the time, address privacy rights.  
Second, because the rulings are based on the First Amendment, emphasizing 
freedom of expression and freedom of the press, we would impose strict lia-
bility and demand accuracy by the press, although it might lead to self-
censorship, which is counter to the purposes of the First Amendment.113  
Third, where the rulings put the public and the press as the protagonists, our 
model looks at the issue of privacy with the individual at the center.  There-
fore, the price of false or inaccurate publication is too high to pay.  Fourth, 
where privacy is based on a liberal conception, our approach is more to-
ward personality theories that enable a balloon of privacy in public do-
mains.  Fifth, and most importantly, the Supreme Court did not imagine 
much less consider the Internet when shaping its tests, finding that “the in-
stances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare.”114  We 
think the digital era has changed the concept of privacy and the rules of the 
game, hurtling society towards a total loss of privacy.115  The right to be 
 
112 Duhart, supra note 25, at 372. 
113 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (“The First Amendment requires that 
we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.”). 
114 Id. at 345. 
115 See Shackelford, supra note 7, at 126 (claiming that our traditional understandings of privacy are 
changing as a result of “an increase in privacy violations, facilitated by new advanced surveillance 
technologies”).  But see Iryna Ievdokymova, ACTA and the Enforcement of Copyright in Cyberspace: The 
Impact on Privacy, 19 EUR. L.J. 759, 762 (2013) (describing Article 27(3) of the European Unions’ 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which “provides that cooperative efforts are to 
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forgotten, given the difficulty of erasing digital publication, compared to 
old-fashioned kinds that disappeared when old journals and newspapers 
were gone – make us rethink the rulings. 
An interesting illustration of our arguments about different approaches 
to privacy (than the U.S. norms), can be partially found in the European 
approach which we will discuss briefly below. 
The different attitude of the European approach to privacy has inspired 
us to think differently, even though this approach was not adopted in our 
proposed model.116  In Continental jurisdictions, such as Germany and 
France, the philosophy of personality theory prevails and values like dignity 
and honor inform legal tools in which individuals, including public figures, 
have the right to control their image and exposure to the public, either by 
traditional publications or by cyberspace tools.  Therefore, even if a public 
figure appeared nude in public, she has the legal right to restrict publication 
of this appearance.  This is true even in cases where a public figure sold her 
nude picture.  The control over the public image invalidates publication af-
ter the sale of the image.  The fact that a public figure agreed to be photo-
graphed in an intimate pose is insufficient to validate the publication of this 
image.117  In the digital age, Continental courts impose restrictions against 
Internet publication of public figures in any way that can harm their image 
(e.g., nude photographs) and they impose liability on Internet providers.118  
Even when, technically, the photographs spread and could be found on 
many Internet sites the European courts still felt obliged to forbid the circu-
lation of the pictures in order to express the importance of private life in 
cases of those who, according to our definitions, are public figures.119  Pub-
lic figures who appear nude still have the right to control their public image 
 
‘preserve fundamental principles such as . . . privacy’” (quoting Margot E. Kaminski, An Overview 
and the Evolution of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI & TECH 385, 412 (2011)). 
116 See Megan Richardson & Lesley Hitchens, Celebrity Privacy and Benefits of Simple History, in NEW 
DIMENSIONS IN PRIVACY LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 250–51 
(Andrew T. Kenyon & Megan Richardson eds., 2006) (providing examples of the European ap-
proach to the privacy of celebrities).  For descriptions and examples of the European system, 
mainly Germany and France about public figures, as well as for court decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), see Shackelford, supra note 7, at 171–98, 207. 
117 Whitman, supra note 51, at 1198–1201 (2004) (discussing examples of famous figures, which we 
would consider public figures, such as French actress Florence Bouvard, whom a French court 
“permitted to suppress movie scenes in which she had willingly appeared naked,” because 
“[o]ne’s nude image is simply not definitively alienable under continental norms;” and stating 
that German and French courts “feel obliged to penalize the persons responsible, be they Inter-
net service providers or delinquent ex-boyfriends”). 
118 Id. at 1998–99. 
119 See Whitman, supra note 51, at 1198–99 (describing a case in which a German court “imposed 
liability on [an] Internet service provider[ ] that housed nude images of celebrities” when Steffi 
Graf, a famous former tennis star, “successfully sued Microsoft for its refusal to . . . prevent dis-
semination of a ‘fake’ . . . picture of her head superimposed on the nude body of another wom-
an,” showing that sometimes relief can be granted when public figures are involved). 
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and determine when and under what circumstances they may be seen, in 
the nude or otherwise. 
Looking at the different approaches of the U.S. and Continental Euro-
pean countries, it seems that American law regarding public figures is 
caught in a gravitational orbit of liberty values, while European law is 
caught in an orbit of personal dignity.  As was claimed about the different 
approaches to privacy on the two sides of the Atlantic, “There are certainly 
times when the two bodies of law approach each other more or less nearly.  
Yet they are consistently pulled in different directions . . . .”120 
In our view, neither of the approaches can prevail in the other jurisdic-
tion because of the different theoretical origins (personal dignity vs. freedom 
of expression).  The model we offer in this paper follows neither approach, 
but rather tries to develop reasonable criteria within the arena of the public 
right to know to decide in which cases it would be legitimate for public in-
terest to prevail versus other cases in which the skimpy balloon of privacy 
available to public figures may prevail.  Accordingly, this paper discusses 
the appropriate relationship between public interest and the right to privacy 
regarding public figures.  More specifically, we will address the question of 
when public figures have the right to keep information away from the pub-
lic.  In the next Part, we will focus on our proposed new filtering model, 
which is more applicable in the digital era, and which addresses this ques-
tion differently and proposes a way to manage which information should be 
published about public figures and which information, if any, should be 
kept private, offering a contrast to the traditional U.S. legal norm that 
grants superiority to the public interest/right to know, resulting in an ex-
treme lack of privacy for public figures. 
IV.  A FILTERING MODEL:  
THE PUBLIC INTEREST TO KNOW VS. PRIVACY PROTECTION 
A.  Public Figures and the Balloon of Privacy 
Ideas for redefining the legal norms regarding public figures have been 
offered by some scholars.  Scott Shackelford, for example, proposed to nar-
row the category of public figure by limiting the legal concept of the public 
figure in the U.S. to four categories: permanent public figures, celebrities, 
temporary public figures, and private citizens.  Following the German rule, 
each category would receive a different degree of privacy and duration of 
 
120 Whitman, supra note 51, at 1162–63 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576–78 (2003)) 
(analyzing Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Lawrence v. Texas, as an example of the 
sometimes mutually influential relationship between the liberty and dignity approaches). 
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protection from the minimum to the maximum.121  Our model works dif-
ferently, without following any specific jurisdiction, but it could be adopted 
by all jurisdictions as general criteria in the digital era. 
One of the most sensitive questions in the discourse of privacy rights of 
public figures is in which cases should information about them not be pub-
lished.  We argue that public figures should also enjoy the “balloon” of pri-
vacy on the Internet to a certain level in any of the following situations: (1) 
the information is private in the sense that it describes intimate personal de-
tails, which do not contribute to or are irrelevant to the fulfillment of his or 
her public role;122 (2) the information serves mainly (if not solely) as voyeur-
ism; and (3) the information is not of a kind that the public figure exposes to 
the public by his or her own will (without regret). 
We claim that every person should have a right to privacy.  Even a pub-
lic figure at the end of the day has the right to private premises.123  The Bal-
loon Theory describes privacy as a sphere that can change in size and exists 
even in public arenas to protect personal privacy.124  The metaphorical bal-
loon symbolizes our psychological perception of private information and 
feelings.  The word “balloon” reflects the way we understand and feel the 
need for privacy.125  According to the theory, the balloon of privacy also ex-
ists in cyberspace around public figures, subject to two exceptions.  First, the 
public figure’s balloon size is smaller compared to that of a “regular,” 
anonymous person.  Second, the mechanisms targeting the size of the bal-
loon and activating the scope of protection are controlled by different rules.  
We believe that the controlling rules should be flexible and correspond with 
different situations.  Thus, defining public figures according to a rigid list or 
claiming that public figures have no right to privacy every time a publica-
tion about them is justified does not lead to a reasonable solution.  In other 
words, a public figure’s balloon of privacy can shrink and expand depend-
ing on the situation.  Furthermore, it would be inappropriate to pre-
determine a permissible degree of severity regarding the harm caused by a 
privacy violation, as the assessment of such harm is unique to a specific in-
dividual, and ought not be predetermined and uniform for each and every 
person within the definition of “public figure,” especially in the digital era. 
B.  The Three Principle Filtering Model 
Our proposed Three Principle Model consists of three elements: (1) the 
relevancy of the private information to members of the public, and (2) 
 
121 Shackelford, supra note 7, at 200–03. 
122 For example if he or she was pictured naked in his or her private home. 
123 David Kretzmer, Demonstrations and the Law, 19 ISR. L. REV. 47, 120 (1984). 
124 See Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 53, at 83–86. 
125 Id. at 82–84. 
May 2017] PUBLIC INTEREST VS. PRIVATE LIVES 1001 
whether access to the information is necessary for learning about our world, 
and (3) proportionality. 
1.  The Relevancy of Private Information 
Our stance is that exposing public figures’ private lives is justified to the 
extent the information exposed is relevant to the public.  Accordingly, this 
article recognizes that the privacy rights of public figures will vary in scope 
according to the relevance of the information about them and the benefit its 
publication would have on the public as compared to the impact it will 
have on the public figure himself or herself.  The results will undoubtedly 
differ from case to case; therefore, we avoid creating bright line rules but 
instead recommend guidelines for addressing each unique case.  Ultimately, 
we argue that any information relevant to one’s functional duties as a pub-
lic figure or information that might influence the public should be pub-
lished, even if it reduces the public figure’s privacy.  In other words, we ar-
gue that public figures waive their right to privacy as long as the 
circumstances meet certain criteria. 
According to our guidelines, the more influential the figure is to the 
public, the smaller his/her privacy balloon is and the more we can publish 
about this person.  For example, prime ministers, according to the balloon 
theory, have the smallest balloon around them and enjoy only a small 
amount of privacy.  In the case of a prime minster and according to the cri-
teria suggested in this paper, we can justify almost all publications about 
him or her on a wide range of public and private topics in a way that al-
most all information can be released to the public.  A prime minister is 
elected by the public to a role defined by law as having a wide range of in-
fluence on each and every citizen.  Any information about a leader of a 
country who possesses more power and authority than any other individual 
would therefore have an important value to the public.  As a result, the 
right for the public to have access to this information overrules the prime 
minister’s right to privacy.  Even “private” information about a spouse, va-
cation habits, the way s/he treats his/her children, and personal health 
conditions may be important according to the criteria we suggest, as they 
might influence his actions and, hence, the public.  Therefore, Internet 
publications of this kind might be justified. 
The wider and the deeper a political figure’s influence is, the wider and 
deeper the range of private information that would be legitimate to publish 
according to our model.  However, we do claim that a limited amount of 
private information can and should be kept within the privacy premises.  In 
other words, there is a limited scope of behavior with a high level of intima-
cy within private places, such as the private homes or even private bath-
rooms, which should remain private.  These premises have no connection 
to the public or influence on the public and should be kept private even 
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when it belongs to a public figure.  For example, the intimate relationship 
of the prime minister with his family or naked pictures of the prime minister 
would be covered within his right to privacy.  In many other cases, behav-
ior that can reveal to the public his or her suitability for office, such as past 
experience, drinking habits or stress habits, should be published.  If any 
doubt about whether to publish certain information exists, it is better to err 
in favor of the public’s right to knowledge.126  We recognize that the harm 
of avoiding publication and maintaining a large balloon might outweigh the 
benefits of protecting privacy in certain cases. 
A journalist, for example, will have more privacy (a larger privacy bal-
loon) than a prime minister.  It would still be important to the public to 
know private information about the journalist that relates to the fields he or 
she is covering, as a means of judging her reliability.  For example, news 
anchor Brian Williams recently lost his job after it became public that he 
had embellished a story from his coverage of the Iraq war in 2003.  Had 
the lie been related to his private life and not his work, which influences the 
millions of viewers who watched the NBC Nightly News, that information 
probably would have been subject to his right to privacy. 
This rule is also applicable in regard to anonymous - innocent people 
who have become involuntarily public figures. 
An anonymous, innocent person can become a public figure and lose 
some of his right to privacy.  For example, someone who takes part in a 
demonstration that ends up being covered by the news can have infor-
mation about him and his private life rightfully published when it is rele-
vant to the purpose of the demonstration.127 
The relevancy of the private information is a dominant criterion of con-
trolling the publication of private data in the digital era, but it is not the sole 
factor.  The next Sub-Part will address an additional criterion controlling 
the size of the privacy balloon of public figures: access to necessary infor-
mation. 
2.  Access to Necessary Information for Learning Important Knowledge about Our 
World and Being Part of Society 
Information is a survival tool.  Access to knowledge and learning about 
the world is another justification for publishing information instead of using 
the right to privacy as an excuse to avoid publication.  In almost every 
 
126 See RICHARDS, supra note 63 (arguing that privacy is valuable in large part because it facilitates 
development and expression of knowledge to the public). 
127 See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644–45 (2000) (describing James Dale, an assis-
tant scoutmaster who was expelled from the Boy Scouts of America after a newspaper published 
an interview identifying him as the copresident of the Lesbian/Gay Alliance at Rutgers Universi-
ty). 
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moment, people make judgments about their next action or decision based 
on the existing information that is available to them.  The more a person 
knows about the world, the better his or her decisions will be.  Information 
on websites can be critical to someone’s integration into society and even to 
one’s survival.128  This principle is distinguished from the first one (relevan-
cy), although they may partially overlap.  Whereas the relevancy principle 
focuses on the role of the public figure, this principle focuses on the public 
access to knowledge—including access to information that may lead to bet-
ter health and education decisions, increased safety and efficiency, and 
overall improvement of individuals’ lives.  The information itself, rather 
than the figure, is placed in the center.  The attention public figures usually 
attract may justify this kind of publication.  The Internet plays an important 
role when implementing this principle.  
Consequently, this factor, which can help us differentiate between in-
formation that falls under public interest and should be published rather 
than hidden behind the right to privacy, concerns access to necessary 
knowledge about the world.  If the information teaches us important 
knowledge about “handling” life, it should be exposed to the public.  How 
we determine whether certain private information provides us with tools to 
handle life’s challenges should, therefore, be included under the public in-
terest justification.129 
People who become the center of news will not only be exposed to the 
public as public figures, but publication of relevant private information 
about them would be justified.  When information is designated to public 
records, publication is also justified.130  Therefore, identifying public figures 
as the ones who are suffering from diseases, especially when those public 
figures suffer from contagious diseases, might be justified as a tool to learn 
about the disease.  However, if the medical condition of a public figure, 
 
128 See generally Craig Calhoun, The Infrastructure Of Modernity: Indirect Social Relationships, Information 
Technology, and Social Integration, in SOCIAL CHANGE AND MODERNITY 205 (Hans Haferkamp &  
eds., 1992) (explaining how information technology facilitates indirect relationships, which are a 
pivotal component of modern society); Jack Balkin, What is Access to Knowledge?, BALKINIZATION 
(Apr. 21, 2006), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/04/what-is-access-to-knowledge.html (ex-
plaining the impact access to information has on social, political, and economic influence). 
129 See, e.g., McNutt v. N.M. State Tribune Co., 538 P.2d 804, 806–08 (1975) (holding publication by 
a newspaper of private names and addresses of police officers who took part in a shootout be-
tween “Black Berets” gang and the police, in which two of the gang members were killed, was 
privileged, where the officers had refused to discuss the matter and their addresses were public 
record). 
130 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (holding that a state may not “impose sanc-
tions on the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from public records”); 
McNutt, 538 P.2d at 808 (“The address of most persons appears in many public records . . . . We, 
therefore, hold that and individual’s home address is a public fact and that its mere publication, 
without more, cannot be viewed as an invasion of privacy.”). 
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such as a singer or an actor, has no informative social function for society, 
the public figure should enjoy a right to privacy.131 
Another example is when a new medical treatment is introduced to the 
public.  The medical history of the people who are taking the treatment 
might be considered private information.  However, as this data is im-
portant to the public for everyone’s survival, it might justify publishing it 
rather than keeping the data private.  The identity of organ or sperm do-
nors should be exposed for the same reasons.  These people find themselves 
to be public figures even if they were focused on other aspects of their activ-
ities.  They have become public figures against their free will.  However, 
exposing information about their medical condition to the public might 
play an important role to avoid future risks to persons within the public.  In 
order to draw some boundaries around this unlimited access to private in-
formation and to control the level of exposure - we need to add a new cu-
mulative factor of proportionality, as we will explain in the next Sub-Part. 
Prosser and Keeton wrote: 
Such individuals become public figures for a season; and “until they have re-
verted to the lawful and unexciting life led by the great bulk of the community, 
they are subject to the privileges which publishers have to satisfy the curiosity of 
the public as their leaders, heroes, villains, and victims.’  The privilege extended 
even to identification and some reasonable depiction of the individual’s family, 
although there must certainly be some limits to their own private lives into 
which the publisher could not go.132 
Freedom of speech may justify the publication of many private details of 
public figures, even when they unwillingly have become famous, such as 
rape victims, adopted children, etc.133  Medical information of rare diseases 
or infection transmitted by humans may justify publication of private details 
due to public interest in these people who have become unwilling public 
figures.134 
 
131 For example, actor Charlie Sheen revealed in 2015 that he contracted HIV four years prior and 
had kept it a secret until then.  Emily Steel, Charlie Sheen Says He Has H.I.V. and Has Paid Millions to 
Keep It Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18/business/-
charlie-sheen-hiv-positive.html?_r=0.  Unlike back in the 1980s or 1990s, when news about a ce-
lebrity being HIV-positive carried a social impact by debunking myths and creating awareness of 
the disease, the news about Charlie Sheen today carries no such value.  The only reason he vol-
untarily sat for an interview was in order to put a stop to extortionists.  Id.  
132 Prosser & Keeton, supra note 20, at 861–62 (footnotes omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) 
OF TORTS §867, Comment f (AM. LAW INST., 1934). 
133 See, e.g., Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 712 (N.C. 1988) (rejecting the claims of Susie Hall and her 
adoptive mother “for tortious invasion of privacy by truthful public disclosure of ‘private’ facts” 
against a newspaper that published an article about Susie’s carnival-traveling parents’ abandon-
ment of her seventeen years prior); see also TRIBE, supra note 20, at 889–90 (explaining that the 
balancing publication of private individuals’ information with individual privacy can be a judg-
ment of degrees). 
134 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, Comment g (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (citing “a 
rare disease” as a newsworthy exception to privacy based on a legitimate public concern). 
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An example of an innocent, unwilling, and young public figure where 
the information published about her is justified in terms of the second crite-
rion of access to knowledge is the case of fourteen-year-old Elizabeth 
Smart.  On June 5, 2002, Elizabeth was abducted from her bedroom in 
Salt Lake City, Utah.  Elizabeth’s parents worked with local and national 
media to increase visibility of the case; public interest in the kidnapping of 
the attractive, accomplished blonde teenager was immense.135  The publica-
tion of these kind of cases, nowadays via the internet, although it involves 
private and intimate information, might help rescue the victim, track and 
punish the criminals, and prevent future crime.  Therefore, exposing pri-
vate details is justified under the second criterion of our proposed model: 
access to knowledge. 
However, according to our model, we claim that freedom of speech is 
not an absolute unlimited right, even for public figures.  Publishing private 
data (medical or other) about people may prevent them from taking part in 
certain activities or medical treatment because they fear that their private 
details and identities will be exposed publically.  For example, on the one 
hand, taking an HIV test serves the public interest, which should be en-
couraged.  On the other hand, publishing the details and results of the HIV 
tests might prevent people from taking the test in the first place.  The harm 
from not taking the test and not detecting the illness might outweigh the 
benefit of publishing the details.136 
The Three Principle Model proposed in this work can serve as a guide-
line for filtering information about public figures and deciding when the in-
formation should be open to the public or when public figures deserve the 
right to privacy.  Activating the model in the digital era requires precau-
tionary steps, which will be activated by the third cumulative principle of 
the proposed model, as will be discussed below.  The level of privacy of 
public figures the model may achieve depends on the number of factors be-
ing used as a filter.  The more factors that are activated in filtering private 
information, the more privacy we achieve. 
 
135 See ELIZABETH SMART & CHRIS STEWART, MY STORY (2013); Elizabeth Smart Fast Facts, CNN 
(Nov. 2, 2016, 2:54 PM) http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/14/us/elizabeth-smart-fast-facts/; see 
also SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS (Sept. 6, 2014, 4:49 PM), 
https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (detailing the ethical responsibilities of journalists, particular-
ly regarding the balancing of reporting private information of individuals).  In this particular case, 
nine months after the abduction, Elizabeth’s younger sister, who had witnessed the kidnapping, 
remembered that the abductor’s voice sounded like that of a vagrant who had done some work 
for the family some months before the kidnapping.  That detail ultimately led to Elizabeth’s res-
cue, which was a major media story nationwide. 
136 See Paul Marcus & Tara L. McMahon, Limiting Disclosure of Rape Victims’ Identities, 64 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1019, 1030–31 (1991) (describing the trauma and stigma associated with being a victim of 
rape, illustrating that unwilling victims of criminal offenses especially must have some volume in 
their privacy balloons). 
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3.  The Proportionality Rule 
When applying rules on publication of private information about public 
figures, we can benefit from the rule of proportionality.  According to the 
proportionality test, the relevant question is whether one can satisfy a legiti-
mate public interest with a less invasive action, which avoids harming the 
rights of others involved.137  In other words, proportionate publication must 
achieve the goals the private data serves without exposing all the details 
about the figure.  For example, it may be proportionate to publish facts 
about medical diseases or a crime without pictures of the victims or other 
irrelevant identifiable information.  If the information published about the 
public figure could have been obtained using less invasive means, exposing 
those details to the public harms their privacy and, therefore, is not justified. 
Freedom of speech justifies as newsworthy “all events and items of in-
formation which are out of the ordinary humdrum routine, and which have 
‘that indefinable quality of information which arouses [sic] public atten-
tion.’”138  Freedom of speech and the right to privacy are generally seen as 
conflicting with one another; however, scholars such as Neil Richards and 
Mark Tunick have expressed that these two rights can peacefully co-
exist.139  Similarly, we assert that certain legal tools, such as the proportion-
ality rule, can be used to adjust the current compromise between freedom 
of speech and protection of privacy. 
For the purpose of understanding the rule of proportionality in regard 
to cases of publications of private information about public figures, consider 
the following two examples. 
a.  Publishing Drunk Drivers’ Photos 
Consider the following excerpt from Elizabeth K. Hansen, for the “So-
ciety of Professional Journalists” in its Ethics Case Studies series: 
 
137 Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 53, at 95; see also Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Bal-
ancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 75 (2008) (“The core of neces-
sity analysis is the deployment of a ‘least-restrictive means’ (LRM) test [in which the court] en-
sures that the measure does not curtail the right any more than is necessary for the government 
to achieve its stated goals.”);  AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 245–378 (Doron Kalir trans., 2012) (exploring four components of 
proportionality, as a applied to legislatures when balancing legislative action against individual 
rights: “proper purpose,” “rational connection,” “necessity,” and proportionality stricto sensu [or, 
‘balancing’]”); id. at 317 (discussing the proportionality principle in the context of general 
consitutional law from a legislative perspective). 
138 KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at 860 (quoting Sweenek v. Pathe News, 16 F. Supp. 746, 747 
(E.D.N.Y. 1936)). 
139 See RICHARDS, supra note 63, at 95 (“Instead of being conflicting values, privacy and speech can 
instead be mutually supportive.”); MARK TUNICK, BALANCING PRIVACY AND FREE SPEECH: 
UNWANTED ATTENTION IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 14 (2015) (contending that the values of 
free speech and privacy can exist hand in hand). 
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  When readers of The Anderson News picked up the . . . issue of the newspa-
per, stripped across the top of the front page was a New Year’s greeting and a 
warning.  “HAVE A HAPPY NEW YEAR,” the banner read.  “But please 
don’t drink and drive and risk having your picture published.”  Readers were 
referred to the editorial page where [it was] explained that . . . the newspaper 
would publish photographs of all persons convicted of drunken driving in An-
derson County.  
  . . . .  
  . . . [The newspaper] limited the photos to residents of Anderson County or 
surrounding counties where the News circulates.  [It] also began publishing the 
photos weekly rather than monthly.   
  After a person charged with DUI was convicted or pleaded guilty, the 
county jailer (who is elected in Kentucky) supplied the information and the 
photo taken at the time of the arrest to the newspaper.  Under each photo the 
newspaper printed the person’s name, age, place of residence, date and time ar-
rested, charge, blood alcohol level and date convicted.  The paper published 
the photos regardless of the age of the offender and made no distinction be-
tween first offenders and those who had been arrested before for DUI.   
 . . . . 
  Police told the newspaper representative one teenager tried to commit suicide 
after his DUI arrest because he feared his picture would be published.  Some 
whose pictures appeared said the publication hurt their families, particularly their 
children . . . . The policy applied only to drunken driving convictions and not to 
any other misdemeanor or felony offenses [such as rape or robbery].140   
According to the model, the information about driving under the influ-
ence meets two criteria: it is important and a value of access to knowledge 
about facts of life (teenagers, politicians, and actually everyone who drinks 
and drives).  However, using the proportionality rule would have enabled 
posting, nowadays via the internet, the blurred photographs of images with 
important details such as age or status without any identifiable details.  This 
rule enables solutions, which are not all or none (posting or avoiding), as the 
case reflects.  “This issue is not black and white; it is a wide range of 
grays.”141 
b.  Naming Victims of Sex Crimes 
These cases also meet both criteria of relevant and legitimate information 
and access to knowledge in the digital era.  However, again, using the rule of 
proportionality, in these cases, the best course of action might be to tell about 
 
140 Elizabeth K. Hansen, Publishing Drunk Drivers’ Photos, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS, 
http://www.spj.org/ecs10.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2017); see also SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y PROF. 
JOURNALISTS (Sept. 6, 2014, 4:49 PM), https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (explaining that 
journalists have an ethical obligation to use “heightened sensitivity” when publishing materials 
regarding juveniles and to “show compassion” for those affected by news coverage) 
141  Amber Orand & Sara Stone, Naming Victims of Sex Crimes, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS, 
http://www.spj.org/ecs11.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2017). 
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the case “but refrain from publishing graphic details about the abuse the 
child endured.  Perhaps in other cases, there is no pressing public interest for 
the child’s identity to be released, and his or her privacy is the utmost consid-
eration.”142 
Applying the proposed Three Principle Filtering Model to court cases 
will be addressed in the next Part. 
V.  FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE—APPLYING THE PROPOSED THREE 
PRINCIPLE FILTERING MODEL 
In this Part, we discuss the implementation of the model for protecting 
versus exposing private information about public figures based on some of 
the famous court decisions which have become foundation stones of the 
discourse on public figures. 
In Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, a former truck hijacker who was con-
victed and subsequently rehabilitated for more than ten years sued Reader’s 
Digest for invasion of privacy after it published an article about truck hi-
jackings that mentioned his name.  Despite having lived an honorable life 
for the past decade, the article’s publication of his private details caused the 
man’s friends and daughter to scorn and abandon him.143 
In Melvin v. Reid, a former prostitute who had been charged with but ac-
quitted of murder sued a film producer.  Following her acquittal, she entire-
ly rehabilitated her life by getting married and living an honest and re-
spectable life.  However, seven years later, a film was released called “The 
Red Kimono,” which presented her story using her real name and the un-
savory details about her past from the record of her murder trial.  The film, 
which was billed as a true story, ruined her new life.144 
Using the Three Principle Model with the proportionality rule in both 
cases would have brought a different and a better solution.  To implement 
the model with the proportionality rule test, one would have to start with 
identifying the purpose of exposing the information.  Then the next step 
would be to check if there are alternative, less invasive means to satisfy the 
same purpose.  If the alternative means serves the same purpose, it should 
be used because it will allow for at least some amount of privacy. 
In Melvin, the purpose of the film was to: (1) present an incredible story 
using creative means and (2) present a true story.  These two purposes 
could have easily been achieved by telling the audience it was a true story 
or that the film was based on a true story without using anyone’s real name.  
In the Briscoe case, however, because it was a criminal offence, we think 
 
142 See id. (examining multiple cases of journalists’ treatment of juvenile sexual assault victims and 
providing guidance on how journalists should treat such subjects). 
143 Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc, 483 P.2d 34, 36 (Cal. 1971). 
144 Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 91, 93 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931). 
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there was no other way to achieve the purpose of warning the public be-
sides exposing the details of the person.145  Therefore, based on our pro-
posed model, the publication was justified.  We argue that when the com-
mon desire of the public is merely to learn intimate, private information 
about a person, but the information does not carry any valuable influence 
over the person looking for the information, publication of private infor-
mation about public figures will not be justified.  Instead, the public figure 
serves as an object to entertain the public with his or her most personal da-
ta.  Within this category we can find mere curiosity, snooping, gossip, or 
perverted behavior. 
Another case that might have reached a different decision had the court 
used the principles of our model is Friedan v. Friedan.146  Our model, alt-
hough not dealing with future public figures directly, does not void the pos-
sibility of exposing private information about future public figures as well as 
about third parties connected to future public figures.  Applying our model 
to the facts of Friedan, being married to someone who would become a pub-
lic figure in the future exposed the family member to the status of a public 
figure with risks of losing privacy with respect to the relationship, if the in-
formation contributes to the public knowledge and access to knowledge.  
However, a picture of a family is not information that should contribute to 
public welfare.  On the other hand if, for example, past spousal violence 
against a feminist activist is involved, the information is important per the 
criteria of our proposed model.147 
One more example of an analysis of the legitimacy of public exposure 
according to our model, which differs from the traditional views of the 
courts (even though reaching the same result), is the famous Supreme Court 
decision on the case of the Hill family.148  In Time, Inc. v. Hill, the “public 
figures” at issue were one-time, past, temporary victims who unwillingly be-
came public figures.  Our model does not undermine the usual definitions, 
but our focus is different.  Our model examines the relevancy and legitima-
cy of the private information.  In this case, Time, Inc., as publisher of Life 
Magazine, was sued by the Hill family.  The five children of the Hill family 
were involuntarily held as prisoners by three escaped convicts for nineteen 
 
145 One can claim that both Briscoe and Melvin were criminal offenses.  The only difference is that he 
was found guilty and she was not. 
146 414 F. Supp. 77, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that the publication of a man’s name and picture in 
an article by his ex-wife is not actionable under the New York Civil Rights Act because matters of 
public interest “may and often do involve wholly private individuals”). 
147 See id. at 78–79 (explaining that the husband of Betty Friedan was declared a public figure twen-
ty-five years before she became famous as a feminist leader; therefore he lost a suit challenging an 
article she had published describing her life with him as connubial and posting a picture of him 
from the past). 
148 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
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hours on September 11–12, 1952.149  They were released unharmed, and 
became the subjects of front-page news.  The drama and publicity caused 
them to suffer, so they moved away to another place.  At about the same 
time (1953), Joseph Hayes wrote a novel titled The Desperate Hours, which 
was a bestseller and later was made into a Broadway play, which was the 
subject of a feature story in Life Magazine.150  Mr. Hill brought a libel 
claim against Life Magazine arguing that Time, Inc. violated the family’s 
privacy and falsely reported that the new play portrayed an experience suf-
fered by Hill and his family.  The article appeared in 1955, entitled “True 
Crime Inspires Tense Play,” claiming that the play was based on the expe-
riences of the Hill family during their period of captivity in their home.151  
The article included pictures of the play’s main actor in the Hill’s prior 
home.  Hill won at the lower court and was awarded $75,000 (later reduced 
to $30,000).152  Time, Inc. appealed to the Supreme Court, where Richard 
Nixon represented the Hill family.153  The publisher claimed that the sub-
ject reflected a “legitimate news interest,” meaning “a subject of general in-
terest and of value and concern to the public.”  At the time of publication, 
the publisher claimed, it was “published in good faith without any malice 
whatsoever.”154  The Court wrote that 
guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or 
comment about public affairs . . . . We have no doubt that the subject of the 
Life article . . . is a matter of public interest.  “The line between the informing 
and the entertaining is too elusive for protection of . . . [freedom of the 
press].”155   
The Court concluded that errors by negligence are protected by freedom of 
expression.156 
Justice Harlan—dissenting in part—noted that the members of the Hill 
family were not public officials but individuals that came to public attention 
through unfortunate circumstances, not by making voluntary actions, and 
thus cannot be considered as having waived state protection from irrespon-
sible publicity.  Justice Harlan contended that “the press should have a duty 
of making a reasonable investigation of the underlying facts and [should] 
limit[ ] itself to ‘fair comment’ on the material gathered . . . .   [S]uch a rule 
 
149 Id. at 378.  
150 Id.  
151  Id. at 377. 
152  Id. at 379. 
153 Id. at 375.  
154 Id. at 378–79.  
155 Id. at 388 (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)). 
156 See id. at 389 (“In this context, sanctions against either innocent or negligent misstatement would 
present a grave hazard of discouraging the press from exercising the constitutional guarantees.”). 
May 2017] PUBLIC INTEREST VS. PRIVATE LIVES 1011 
might slightly limit press discussion of matters touching individuals like Mr. 
Hill.”157 
An analysis of the case according to our model raises different issues.  
The case does not meet the first test: the relevancy of the information of the 
public making decisions about the public figure, but meets the second test, 
in offering important life ideas of cultural merit.  Implementing the third 
criterion of proportionality leaves us with the impression that too many pri-
vate details were unnecessarily exposed beyond the data reasonably needed 
to justify the goals of our model. 
The Supreme Court has not thought about the Internet when shaping 
its tests about public figures.  “[T]he instances of truly involuntary public 
figures must be exceedingly rare.”158  However, in the age of smartphones, 
Facebook, and YouTube, privacy on the one hand may seem like a thing of 
the past, but on the other hand, we see an amplified need for protection of 
privacy.  In his book Balancing Privacy and Free Speech: Unwanted Attention in the 
Age of Social Media, Mark Tunick addresses the ethical and legal questions 
that arise when media technology is used to give individuals unwanted at-
tention.159  In many cases, privacy interests can outweigh society’s interest 
in free speech and access to information.  Based on Jeremy Waldron’s polit-
ical theory concerning tolerance, Tunick argues that we can “have a legiti-
mate interest in controlling the extent to which information about us is dis-
seminated.”160  By addressing the debate about the right to be forgotten, 
Tunick discusses the cost of free speech and legal tools needed to develop 
new social attitudes towards privacy.161  For example, he advises revising 
the code of ethics for professional journalists and the media, “to 
acknowledge the need to be more sensitive to the privacy [issues and] inter-
ests at stake when information that is [considered] public [because it is] ac-
cessible to some [people and] is [then] made readily . . . [available] to a 
much broader audience . . . . [S]elf-regulation by . . . the media [alone] is 
unlikely to result in a fair balancing of interests.”162  Technology today 
“makes it possible for anyone to share information [(whether true or false)] 
widely with a click of a button [and] little incentive to think 
about . . . consequences.”  Legal remedies and punishments can make peo-
 
157 Id. at 409 (Harlen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
158 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). 
159 TUNICK, supra note 139. 
160 Id. at i. 
161 See id. at 193–207 (arguing that even in a society where a majority of people do not strongly value 
privacy, the majority should be sensitive to the interests of those who do). 
162 See id. at 193 (“. . . self-regulation by journalists and the media is unlikely to itself result in a fair 
balancing of the interests.”). 
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ple think carefully before clicking the button.163  The law in the U.S. could 
conceivably “be reformed to compel companies like [Google] or Facebook 
to remove offensive material when they are made aware of it, though that 
would create the problem of how one determines if a request is reasona-
ble.”  As another example, “Daniel Solove recommend[ed] modifying the 
Communication Decency Act (CDA) . . . [to provide an] incentive to re-
move offensive material[s] once they are [made known].”164  Individuals 
can have legitimate privacy interests in remaining anonymous in public 
places unless there is a compelling interest to share information.165 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Anita Allen contends that privacy is a “foundational human 
good[ ],” one that is essential for a free and democratic society.  She argues 
that in certain instances, privacy must be mandated: “[F]or the sake of 
foundational human goods, liberal societies properly constrain both gov-
ernment coercion and individual choice . . . .”166 
The discussion of privacy rights of public figures is currently highly in-
fluenced by the digital era for many reasons.  Among them is the strong 
and wide impact of publication on the Internet as well as the inapplicability 
of the right to be forgotten, especially in the light of being a public figure—
a category that was exempted from the right of deleting information even 
by the Google Spain Court decision.167  “[D]ue to advancing technology 
facilitating the public’s fascination with celebrity, jurisdictions in the United 
States and Europe are reinterpreting privacy rights leading to divergent def-
initions of both public figures and the public interest.”168  As technology be-
 
163 See id. at 194 (discussing both the positives and negatives to how developments in technology im-
pact the privacy of individuals outside of the public sphere, and noting that “it may be harder to 
promote compliance with norms if those norms are not supported by the force of law”). 
164 See id. at 199–200 (citing DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 149–60 (2007)) (re-
counting Daniel Solove’s reasoning for recommending a modification the CDA). 
165 See id. at 200–201 (proposing changes to legislation in order to protect individuals’ privacy inter-
ests unless the challenged speech reaches a certain standard of newsworthiness to a specified au-
dience). 
166 ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 13 (2011). 
167 See Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Case C-131/12, E.C.R., ¶ 
100(4) (May 13, 2014) http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.-
jsf?doclang=EN&docid=152065 (ruling that an individual has a valid privacy interest in having 
their personally identifying information removed from Internet search engines but that it may be 
overridden “if it appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in 
public life, that the interference with his fundamental rights is juditified by the preponderant in-
terest of the general public in having . . . access to the information in question”). 
168 Shackelford, supra note 7, at 126 (“. . . potential reasons for this divergence, including the United 
States’ deep commitment to free speech, different understandings of the public interest, and, most 
critically, varying legal cultures.”). 
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comes more advanced, the need to protect one’s right to privacy become 
increasingly important. 
In this paper we drew a model based on the balloon theoretical justifica-
tion to privacy.  The model was written about public figures but can be 
used in other cases, such as with women or children’s privacy.  Our model 
will allow privacy rights to be interfered with only when justified under the 
Three Principle Filtering Model. 
Many questions remain open to future studies and discussions.  One 
very important matter for policy makers to address will be the question of 
who will judge and decide. 
A professional resource for journalists, when discussing issues of privacy 
and public interest, concludes that “there is often no clear-cut distinction be-
tween right and wrong.  We can give some general guidance and suggest a 
few rules, but [the journalist] will have to decide what to do case-by-case.”169 
We hope that our Three Principle Filtering Model will help not only 
journalists but also judges and other policy makers to make structured, in-
formed, and legitimate decisions when addressing publication of private in-
formation in regards to public figures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
169 The News Manual, A Professional Resource For Journalists and Public Interest, Chapter 62: Pri-
vacy and Public Interest (2008), http://www.thenewsmanual.net/Manuals
%20Volume%203/volume3_62.htm. 
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